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Abstract
A traditional education system, based on the Confucian classics, was a pillar of imperial
China’s social structure for centuries, preparing elites for a series of highly competitive
exams conferring gentry status and civil service positions. Reformers in late imperial
China called for the modernization of educational institutions, seeing in Western ed-
ucation the skills necessary to develop China’s economy. In the late 19th century, the
traditional education system was joined by a “modern”, Western track, which offered
teaching in science, math, social science, law, and engineering. In this paper, early 20th
century employee records from the Tianjin-Pukou Railroad are analyzed to identify dif-
ferences in labor market outcomes associated with study in the traditional and modern
educational systems. The employee records reveal that modern and traditional educa-
tion were both associated with wage premiums, but that these were significantly larger
for individuals trained at high levels in the modern system, especially those trained in
engineering. Individuals trained in the traditional system worked disproportionately
in the clerical department of the railroad, while those with modern education were
more often in managerial and technical roles. Qualitative and quantitative evidence
suggests that these results are not driven by sorting into educational institutions ac-
cording to ability. These findings indicate that beyond years of schooling, the content
of schooling can play an important role in the process of economic development.
Keywords: Educational Content, Educational Institutions, Industrial Development,
Republican China
JEL Codes: I25, J24, N15, N35, O14
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1 Introduction
A traditional education system, based on the Confucian classics, was a pillar of impe-
rial China’s social structure, government, and economy for centuries. Study in traditional
schools prepared students to take a series of highly competitive exams that conferred gen-
try status and civil service positions upon those who passed. Elman (2000, p. xvii) writes,
“In China since medieval times, imperial dynasties, gentry-literati elites, and classical stud-
ies were tightly intertwined in the operation of the civil service examinations. All three
were perpetuated during the late empire (1368–1911), and they stabilized for five hundred
years because of their interdependence.”
Military defeats at the hands of Western countries (in Opium Wars ending in 1842 and
1860) as well as Japan (in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895) indicated to many Chi-
nese the need for institutional change. Among the changes proposed were reforms to the
structure and content of the imperial exams, and thus to the content of the education sys-
tem. There were passionate statements made on both sides of the debate over educational
reform. Those in favor saw clear links among international competitiveness, economic
modernization, and educational reform. Elman (2006, p. 201) writes of a Qing official who
felt that “the military successes of Meiji Japan were a model for China and that emulating
the Japanese would require expanded education in the sciences and industry.” In 1898, the
Guangxu Emperor wrote, “Our scholars are now without solid and practical education; our
artisans are without scientific instructors; when compared with other countries we soon
see how weak we are” (Headland, n.d., p. 116). In contrast, rather than view Meiji Japan
as a paragon, conservatives argued that “For five thousand years the spirit of the sages has
continued in China . . . [we] absolutely must not do as the Japanese, who had dispensed
with their own learning in favor of Western learning” (Weston, 2002, p. 108).1
1Of course, such passion may have been due to a desire to maintain rents accruing to conservatives as much
2
Beginning in the second half of the 19th century, a modern (Western) educational track
gradually developed in imperial China. Military arsenal schools, first established in the
1860s by the Qing government as part of a movement toward “self strengthening,” trans-
lated Western scientific texts into Chinese, and provided training necessary for the adop-
tion of Western military technologies (Elman, 2006). A small modern educational hierarchy,
including high schools and colleges, developed as well, especially in the treaty ports con-
trolled by Western powers. These modern schools were often staffed by missionaries, and
taught foreign languages and Western math and science. Chinese students were also able
to access Western knowledge through study abroad.
While the cultural, social, and political consequences of the China’s Confucian educa-
tion system and imperial civil service exams have received a great deal of attention (for
example, Chang, 1955; Ho, 1962; Miyazaki, 1981; Chaffee, 1995; Elman, 2000), very little di-
rect evidence exists on the consequences of the establishment of modern, Western schools;
micro-level evidence is particularly scarce.2 Were reformers in the late Qing correct that the
human capital produced by training in modern subjects—especially Western science and
engineering—was crucial to the development of modern industry in China? Or was the
rigorous academic training of the traditional education system useful and general enough
to make traditionally-educated individuals productive even in modern, industrial firms?
In this work, I undertake a quantitative comparison of modern and traditional edu-
cational institutions in late imperial and republican China using micro-level data on in-
dividuals’ educational backgrounds and their labor market outcomes. I use a sample of
as it was due to a love of classical Chinese learning. Hon (2002, p. 96) writes that, “conservatives had many
reasons to object to reform, especially political reform. Some were antiquarians; others were by nature skeptical
of change. But a large number were ‘corrupt bureaucrats’ (suli) who had a vested interest in preserving the
political status quo.” Cantoni and Yuchtman (2013) discuss the political economy of educational reform in
Qing China in more detail.
2Bai (2014) shows that after the traditional civil service exams were abolished, prefectures sending more
students to Japan for the study of modern subjects also experienced an increase in the establishment of modern
firms.
3
employee records from the Tianjin-Pukou (JinPu) Railroad that were compiled in 1929
to examine the associations between employees’ educational backgrounds and their labor
market outcomes—both their wages and occupations at the railroad.3 If the human capital
produced in modern, Western schools was more productive in modern, industrial firms,
one would expect to see large wage premiums paid to individuals trained in the modern
education system, relative to individuals trained in the traditional system, ceteris paribus.4
If traditional and modern education provided very different skills, one would also expect
individuals trained in the two systems to sort into different occupations.5
At the broadest level, I find that traditional and modern education are in fact associ-
ated with very similar wage premiums, relative to unskilled workers at the railroad. This
suggests the traditional system did produce skills that were useful to modern, industrial
firms. However, when educational background is disaggregated, one sees enormous pre-
miums paid to modern university and, especially, engineering training, dwarfing the pay
to individuals with even high levels of traditional education. University-trained engineers
earned around 100 percent more, on average, than individuals trained at a high level in
the traditional system; employees with modern university training in other fields (such as
3The data are imperfect: the sample is a convenience sample, and some employees’ wages are not observed,
but rather inferred from pay scales. Still, the data are extremely valuable: datasets containing information on
individuals’ education and wages in the early 1900s are difficult to find even in the United States (see Goldin
and Katz, 2000). Not only is it unusual to observe employee records that include information on education
and salaries at this time, but it is even more remarkable to observe employees trained in both modern and
traditional educational systems, allowing one to compare salaries and occupations depending on whether an
employee studied traditional or modern subjects.
4Throughout this work, I assume that differences in salaries represent differences in employees’ marginal
product, and the existence of generally well-functioning, competitive labor markets. This is only a rough
approximation in any labor market, though Rawski (1989) suggests that Chinese labor markets were quite well-
functioning by 1929, the year the employee records I analyze were compiled. Still, this assumption requires
further attention; I discuss differing degrees of friction in the labor markets facing individuals in the traditional
and modern education systems below (see Section 4).
5Roy (1951) presents a canonical model of sorting into occupations according to differences in productivity.
In the empirical work below, I focus on sorting across occupations within a firm. Of course, individuals would
be expected to select across firms (and industries) as well as across occupations within a firm; I discuss selec-
tion across firms and industries, and how these affect the conclusions that can be drawn from a single firm’s
employee records, in detail below (see Section 4).
4
business, law, and economics) earned around 40 percent more than individuals trained at a
high level in the traditional system. One also sees striking differences in occupations asso-
ciated with educational background. Employees trained in the modern education system
were significantly more often in managerial and railroad planning positions; traditionally-
educated workers were disproportionately employed in clerical positions. These results
suggest that modern education, indeed, produced differentially valuable human capital to
modern, industrial firms. This human capital generated a higher wage, and was put to use
in different occupations at the JinPu Railroad.
These findings from the JinPu Railroad contribute to a growing body of research aimed
at understanding the economic development experiences of late imperial and republican
China, both the sluggish modernization in the late imperial period, and the economic
growth in the republican era. This literature builds on a large body of research on the
Needham Puzzle and the “Great Divergence”, which is focused on the questions of why
Europe was able to economically and technologically surpass China, and why Europe, but
not China, experienced an indigenous industrial revolution.6
Historians and economists have discussed the economic consequences associated with
the traditional education system in the context of the “Great Divergence” literature: Huff
(2003) argues that traditional Chinese education was too closely linked to the structure of
the imperial government and the official ideology; thus, there was no insulated space for
researchers to conduct potentially disruptive scientific research, as there was in Europe. Lin
(1995) argues that Chinese elites were incentivized to invest in human capital that would
produce examination success, rather than scientific discovery. Their work highlights the
role of traditional education in China’s historical development, but lacks systematic em-
pirical evidence with which to substantiate this link. The JinPu employee records allow for
6See, among others, Mokyr (1990), Pomeranz (2000), Morris (2010), Rosenthal and Wong (2011), Hoffman
(2012), Ashraf and Galor (2013), and Brandt et al. (2014).
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a novel individual-level analysis of the economic consequences of traditional and modern
Chinese education. By examining the microeconomic, labor market outcomes associated
with each educational system, one can better understand the human capital generated in
each system, and the role that modern educational institutions played in China’s devel-
opment. In addition to providing new evidence of productivity (i.e., wage) differences
associated with study in different educational institutions, this article complements work
on the Great Divergence by studying the role of educational institutions in China’s failure
to adopt industrial technologies in the Qing, as well as China’s more successful moderniza-
tion during the republican period.7
Recent work has linked the introduction of Western ideas and institutions to more suc-
cessful episodes of economic development in late imperial and republican China. Ma (2004,
2006, 2008) focuses on the role of political and legal institutions in promoting growth in the
first half of the twentieth century, with the Shanghai region experiencing especially rapid
growth as a result of the better, foreign, institutions there. Jia (2014) shows that the treaty
ports controlled by Western powers experienced more rapid growth than other cities with
similar geographic characteristics. Bai and Kung (forthcoming) present evidence that Chi-
nese counties with more Protestant missionaries were more urbanized (and thus plausi-
bly more developed) than other counties in the early 20th century.8 Complementing their
work, in this article I point to the importance of Western education, especially training in
engineering, in China’s ability to adopt Western industrial technologies (Elman, 2006 and
Chang, 1993 make arguments along these lines as well).
More generally, the analysis here builds on work by Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992),
Galor and Weil (2000), Glaeser et al. (2004), Galor and Moav (2006), and Goldin and Katz
7Sng and Moriguchi (2014) argue that Meiji Japan’s far more successful modernization in the 19th century,
vis a´ vis China, can be attributed to greater state capacity in the former.
8Jia (2014) and Chen et al. (2014) present evidence that Western influence had persistent consequences into
the late 20th century.
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(2010) emphasizing the role of human capital investments in the process of industrializa-
tion, technological change, and the rise of modern economic growth. My findings provide
suggestive evidence that educational content and the choice of educational institutions—
the types of human capital invested in, in addition to quantities of human capital—matter
for productivity, and thus can play an important role in the process of economic develop-
ment.9
The paper will proceed as follows: in Section 2, I discuss the differences in content and
structure between the traditional and modern educational systems. In Section 3, I analyze
the JinPu Railroad employee records, providing a brief description of the Railroad and its
employee records, then examining salary and occupational differences across employees
with differing educational backgrounds. In Section 4, I discuss several important concerns
regarding the interpretation of my findings. Finally, in Section 5, I provide a summary and
conclude.
2 Comparing Educational Tracks
Traditional and modern educational institutions in 19th century China were structured
differently, with different objectives, suggesting that they produced very different forms of
human capital. In this subsection, I provide an overview of the two systems.
9Along similar lines, Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014) argue that the establishment of universities in medieval
Europe supported economic activity through the legal training provided (see also Cantoni and Yuchtman,
2013). Squicciarini and Voigla¨nder (2014) argue that upper tail, scientific knowledge was crucial to the adoption
of industrial revolution technologies in France; and, Jones (2014) makes a related argument, that the “depth” of
training is crucial to economic growth. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) make the complementary argument that
human capital quality must be considered alongside quantity in studying the relationship between education
and growth.
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2.1 The Traditional Chinese Education System
The traditional Chinese education system provided training in the Confucian classics as
preparation for a series of highly competitive exams, beginning at the local level, then
rising to the national-level exams in Beijing that were used to select individuals for service
in the imperial bureaucracy.10
The number of traditionally-educated students is very difficult to estimate precisely
(traditional schooling was almost entirely decentralized, so there is no single source of en-
rollment data). Chang (1955) estimates that there were nearly 1,000,000 degree-holding
members of the Chinese gentry in the late 19th century; as the exams were highly compet-
itive (even at the lowest levels), there were surely many more than 1,000,000 individuals
enrolled in schools and academies that constituted the traditional system.11
Students preparing for the exams began their studies as young children, first learning
basic Chinese characters, and as they progressed, memorizing the thousands of characters
from which the Confucian classics were composed.12 After mastering the basic characters,
students would study Tang dynasty (618–907 A.D.) poetry and begin working through the
Four Books and the Five Classics (the classical texts on which they would be examined).
Many years of diligent study were required to master and memorize these books; for ex-
ample, Zhang Jian, a scholar in the second half of the 19th century, could recite the Four
Books from memory at age 12, after nine years of study; many examination candidates
studied well into their 20s and 30s (and some even longer). Students would devote yet
10It is important to note that the traditional education system served political, cultural and social functions
beyond its usefulness in selecting bureaucrats and its provision of human capital (see Chaffee, 1995; Elman,
2000).
11The lower levels of the traditional education system, schools organized at the clan-, or village-level, pro-
vided millions of children with some level of literacy. Rawski (1979) argues that perhaps 30 percent of Chinese
had some ability to read; these individuals likely studied for some time in a traditional school, but with aims
less ambitious than achieving gentry status. Baten et al. (2010) show that 19th century Chinese were relatively
numerate as well.
12The description of training for the exams comes from Elman (2000, p. 275) which is based on the education
of scholar Zhang Jian in the second half of the 19th century.
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more time to practicing their composition skills—most importantly, the “eight-legged es-
says” they were forced to produce on their examinations—and reading commentaries and
histories that would be useful for their exams.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of traditional training was its narrow focus: mastery
of the Confucian classics and the ability to write the eight-legged essays were almost ex-
clusively the skills that determined a candidate’s success on the exams in the late Qing.13
Importantly (and understandably), students responded to the incentives offered by the ex-
amination system and often did not seek broad educations that went beyond the material
needed to succeed in the exams.
The narrow focus of the exams was recognized as a problem by reformers in the second
half of the 19th century. Among other proposed reforms, attempts were made to intro-
duce new, Western subjects—particularly the sciences—into the civil service exams, and
thus into the traditional curriculum.14 However, changes in the content of the imperial ex-
ams in the 19th century were unsuccessful in encouraging serious study of modern science
among those preparing for the imperial exams. Exam prompts regarding Western science
were philosophical, rather than applied, such as the following: “Much of European sci-
ence originates from China; we need to stress what became a lost learning as the basis for
wealth and power” (Elman, 2006, p. 145). Furthermore, essays on Western science were
judged according to their stylistic and literary merit, rather than scientific aptitude. Elman
writes, “The civil examinations were the last bastion of traditional Chinese science, where
the ‘Chinese origins’ approach to Western learning remained obligatory.”
Calls for comprehensive educational and examination reform briefly bore fruit, in the
13The metropolitan examination, which qualified individuals for imperial civil service positions, contained
a section on the Four Books and poetry, a section on the Five Classics, and a section on Policy. However, the
policy questions were “typically overlooked” by graders (Elman, 2000, p. 523).
14These efforts were badly needed: Elman (2006) writes, “By 1750, textbooks made the application of me-
chanical principles accessible to anyone literate in English or French, and artisans and engineers applied them.
None were translated into Chinese, because the Jesuits [who controlled the transfer of Western science to China
in the 18th century] never made the jump to the mathematicization of practical mechanics.”
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100-days reform of 1898.15 But, as the name suggests, reform did not last, as conserva-
tives quickly re-asserted themselves, maintaining the traditional curriculum and exams
until 1905. Until then, to receive useful training in Western science one needed to exit the
traditional system and enter a modern school that did not train students for the imperial
exams.
2.2 Modern, Western Education in Late Imperial and Republican China
During the second half of the 19th century, the Qing engaged in a limited set of educational
reforms, part of the “Self Strengthening” movement. Military arsenal schools were first
established in the 1860s by the Qing government. These schools produced translations
of Western books and scientific journals, and provided training in science and engineering
that was aimed at producing militarily useful skills and knowledge, though this knowledge
was also useful in nonmilitary fields.
A modern educational hierarchy, including high schools and universities, taught West-
ern subjects as well, including modern mathematics and sciences, foreign languages, and
engineering. These schools were often staffed by missionaries, and were often located in
the treaty ports established after the Opium Wars. The important role played by West-
erners in the expansion of modern education in China can be seen in the actions taken by
the British company, John Swire and Sons, in the early 20th century.16 In 1909, the com-
pany granted £40,000 toward the establishment of the University of Hong Kong.17 Of the
first three academic chairs to be established, one was to be in “‘Applied Science,’ for the
education of Railway, Mining and Electrical Engineers, Surveyors, etc. (of whom [China]
15Karl and Zarrow (2002) discuss the educational and political reforms of 1898, as well as their legacy.
16Swire and Sons was the predecessor to the extant firm, Swire Group. In the early 20th century, its China
business included trade, shipping, refineries, dock management, and finance.
17Swire and Sons Archive, JSSI 4/3 Box 1171.
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stands greatly in need for the development of her resources).”18 The firm makes explicit
the applied aims of the training to be provided; in a letter, a company official wrote:
The project is neither purely Altruistic nor purely Utilitarian. I claim for it an
eminently practical basis benefitting China and ourselves equally. The benefits
to China have already been summarized, and it is needless to dwell on the im-
mense alleviation of human suffering which will result from a steady output of
Chinese medical men working among their own people and of Chinese engi-
neers who can assist in averting the constantly recurring famines and loss of life
due to inundations of rivers and lack of irrigation, or the wealth and prosperity
which would accrue to the teeming poverty-stricken population by the opening
up of railways and mines, and improvements in agriculture and forestry.19
In the last quarter of the 19th century, Chinese students were also able to access West-
ern knowledge through study abroad. Japan, which had already reformed its educational
institutions, and incorporated the teaching of Western science, was the most important des-
tination for Chinese students. The United States also played an important role in training
Chinese in Western subjects like medicine, engineering, and law.
While conservatives in the imperial government were able to prevent large-scale re-
forms in the late 19th century, they faced continual pressure, and their control over edu-
cational institutions was short-lived. The traditional examination system was finally abol-
ished in 1905, just a short time before the last Qing emperor abdicated the throne, in 1912.20
As reformers had believed, eliminating the incentives for studying the Confucian classics
(provided by the traditional civil service exams) led the modern education system to grow
18JSSI 4/3 Box 1171.
19JSSI 4/3 Box 1171.
20Wright (1968) discusses revolutionary developments in China in the first decade of the 20th century.
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rapidly, from around 4,000,000 students in the 1910s to over 12,000,000 in the 1930s (Yan,
2007, Table 8).
2.3 Summary: Comparing Traditional and Modern Education
Traditional and modern educational institutions in late 19th century China differed greatly
in the training they provided: in the traditional system, one would master the Confucian
classics and perfect one’s writing skills; in the modern system, one would take courses on
Western subjects, whether languages, mathematics, engineering, or law. Ex ante, it seems
likely that individuals trained in the modern system would be very productive and earn
high wages in modern firms, especially if they possessed training in fields like engineering.
What is less clear is whether the traditional education system produced human capital that
was valuable to modern, industrial firms.
On the one hand, one might think that studying the classics and writing essays would
not produce the technical skills necessary to work in or manage a modern firm. On the
other hand, the traditional Chinese education system provided precisely the sort of clas-
sical liberal arts training that was offered in the English universities in the 18th and 19th
centuries, during the Industrial Revolution.21 The traditional education system forced stu-
dents to memorize huge amounts of material, to think about abstract concepts, and to
write persuasively—all intellectual skills that could serve them well in a variety of posi-
tions, perhaps especially in administrative and managerial roles. The extraordinary levels
of persistence and discipline demanded by the traditional system surely imparted valuable
non-cognitive skills (Heckman et al., 2006). Thus, while traditionally-educated individuals
might play different roles from individuals trained in the modern system, it is not obvious
whether traditionally-educated individuals would be less productive than those educated
21See Coleman (1973) for a discussion of debates in Britain regarding classical and practical education during
and after the Industrial Revolution.
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in the modern system, even within an industrial firm like the JinPu Railroad.
3 Examining Labor Market Outcomes Using Tianjin-Pukou Rail-
road Employee Data
3.1 Background: the JinPu Railroad
The JinPu Railroad was a joint German-British venture, initiated in 1898, to link Northern
China to the rich Shanghai-Nanjing region.22 Initially, the railroad relied almost exclusively
on non-Chinese for skilled labor. The track was finally completed in 1912, though by this
time the railroad was under the control of the recently-established Republic of China (yet
still financed by foreign capital). The railroad was successful, despite the fact that it was
surrounded by political uncertainty: Ko¨ll (2009) writes, “[T]he JinPu line soon became a se-
rious competitor [against the Grand Canal] for goods transportation into Hebei, Shandong,
and Anhui provinces and strengthened the commercial ties between Shanghai and eastern
Shandong.”23 The railroad was fortunate not to be the site of many conflicts between labor
and management, as were other Chinese railroads in the 1920s.
In 1928, the Nationalist Government’s Ministry of Railroads took control of the JinPu
Railroad, and centralized aspects of hiring and pay, specifically for the skilled workers who
are the focus of this study.24 Shortly after taking control, the Ministry collected information
on skilled workers, including salary and educational background, providing a rare source
of early 20th century data on these two variables for a sample of Chinese workers.
22This section draws on Ko¨ll (2009). Morgan (2001) provides a detailed description of railroad personnel
policies in republican China.
23The political environment was constantly changing: the Germans in Shandong province were replaced by
Japanese after World War I, then the Japanese replaced several years later by Chinese, and until 1928, China
was fought over by warlords. Still, the railroad continued to function successfully.
24The Nationalist Government, based in Nanjing, took control of China in 1928 as well.
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3.2 Description of the Dataset
The sample I analyze consists of a cross-section of 829 Railroad employees; the records are
not a random sample, but are a broad sample of the JinPu Railroad’s workers (a page from
the employee records is provided in Appendix Figure A.1).25 Very low skill, manual labor-
ers, who comprised a sizable fraction of railroad workers, are not included, however. The
workers in the sample were employed in a variety of occupations, from clerks to police
officers, to managers, to engineers. For each employee, the Railroad’s records contain in-
formation on age, province of origin, occupation title, department, monthly salary (or pay
grade), tenure with the Railroad, level and type of schooling completed, and prior work
experience.
Two-thirds of the employees in the dataset received a salary and one-third had an as-
signed pay grade. Pay grades are converted into salaries using the mapping provided in
the 1932 Railway Yearbook (Tiedao Nianjian), the earliest yearbook I could find with salaries
matched to pay grades. Concerns about the conversion of pay grades into salaries distort-
ing inferences are discussed in Section 4.
Summary statistics for the sample of employees are shown in Table 1. Yearly salaries
are high by the standards of republican China: Rawski (1989, p. 310) cites miners in China
in 1927 earning around $100 per year, while the JinPu workers in the sample earn nearly
$1,000 per year.26 Workers in the sample, on average, had worked for the JinPu Railroad
for nearly six years when the records were compiled, and many of them had worked in the
railroad industry prior to their employment with the JinPu Railroad (nearly 60 percent).
The distribution of yearly salaries can be seen in Figure 1, smoothed using the Epanech-
nikov kernel density estimator. The graph has the familiar log-normal shape, and in the
25The sample was originally collected by Professor Elisabeth Ko¨ll.
26All monetary quantities are expressed in Chinese dollars. The exchange rate between the Chinese dollar
and the U.S. dollar in 1929 ranged from 2.2 Chinese dollars per U.S. dollar to 2.7 Chinese dollars per U.S. dollar
(numbers taken from the Global Financial Data database).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
yearly salary 806 960.61 746.40 180 6600
age (years) 757 36.91 9.26 16 74
tenure (years) 802 5.99 7.08 0 24
prior jobs 829 2.50 1.99 0 11
railroad experience 829 0.59 0.49 0 1
industry experience 829 0.21 0.41 0 1
government experience 829 0.31 0.46 0 1
teaching experience 829 0.12 0.32 0 1
military experience 829 0.20 0.40 0 1
banking experience 829 0.03 0.16 0 1
Note: Salary denominated in Chinese dollars, which exchanged for American dollars at
approximately 2.5 Chinese dollars per American dollar. “Prior jobs” is a count of jobs
worked prior to the current position with the JinPu Railroad that are listed in the
employee’s record; the “experience” variables are dummy variables equal to 1 if an
employee had experience in the relevant category listed in his record. The number of
observations varies due to some missing values.
empirical analysis, log salaries will be examined.
In Table 2, one can see summary statistics for a set of educational category dummy
variables constructed from the employee records. These variables equal 1 if an individual
was trained in the relevant education system, or, in the case of no education, if the education
field was blank in the employee records.27 These broad categories do not use all of the
available information on educational background (I exploit this information further, by
disaggregating these categories, below), but they are an informative first cut of the data.
27In the empirical work that follows, I exclude individuals without information on educational background,
because this group includes both individuals with no formal education and individuals whose educational
background was missing. Results are very similar when these individuals are included as a separate category.
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Figure 1: Distribution of yearly salaries. Salaries come from 806 workers with information
on salary or grade, with grades converted into salaries using the conversion from the 1932
Railway Yearbook.
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Although the majority of individuals in the sample come from the modern system (59
percent, or 485 individuals), traditionally-educated workers are a non-trivial minority (5.7
percent, or 47 individuals), and one can see that, unconditionally, they are paid very well.28
One can also see substantial differences in average age, tenure, and prior work experience
associated with different educational backgrounds. Controlling for these characteristics
will be important to the empirical analysis below. Of course, concerns about unobserved
worker characteristics that are correlated with educational background and also with labor
market outcomes will be a major challenge to the empirical analysis, and are discussed in
more detail below (see Section 4).
3.3 Earnings Differences
To preview the analysis, Figure 2 presents box plots showing (raw) salary ranges by educa-
tional category for: (i) coarse educational categories—traditional education versus modern;
(ii) narrow categories at the highest level of education—university training in the mod-
ern system versus higher-level traditional; and, (iii) narrow categories within the highest
level of modern education—engineering training versus non-engineering university train-
ing versus higher-level traditional. One can see that modern education is associated with
somewhat lower salaries than traditional education overall; university education is associ-
ated with slightly higher salaries than high levels of traditional education; and, engineer-
ing training at university associated with higher salaries than non-engineering university
training, which in turn is associated with slightly higher salaries than high levels of tradi-
tional education.29 These basic patterns are explored in more depth below.
28Note that some traditional schools introduced some teaching of modern subjects in the second half of the
nineteenth century. Misclassification of individuals’ educational backgrounds will bias results toward finding
no difference across systems.
29The absence of outliers in salaries once logs are taken is reassuring given the relatively small cell sizes for
narrower educational categories.
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3.3.1 The Empirical Model
To associate differences in educational backgrounds with differences in salaries, I estimate
the following model:
log(Salary)i = ∑
c
βcEducci + γZi + ǫi (1)
The outcome variable is the log of the yearly salary of employee i. The explanatory vari-
ables of interest are a set of educational background dummy variables, Educci (with edu-
cation categories indexed by c). To begin, the categories c will be the “broad” educational
categories examined in Table 2: modern, traditional, military, apprenticeship, and police
training (narrower categories are considered below). The model will also include a vector
of individual-specific controls (Zi), such as province of origin, age, tenure with the railroad,
etc. (so γ is a vector), and an idiosyncratic error term. This specification is analogous to
a Mincer (1974) earnings model used to estimate the returns to schooling, but in this case
used to examine differences in earnings associated with categories of schooling c, rather
than differences in earnings associated with years of schooling.30
I would like to interpret differences in the estimates of βc as evidence of log salary
differences caused by differences in employees’ educational backgrounds, but of course,
educational attainment in my sample is not randomly assigned. One might be particularly
concerned about individuals with differing (unobserved) ability levels selecting systemat-
ically into particular educational categories. This important concern is discussed in detail
below (see Section 4).
30Similar models have been estimated to examine the economic returns to students’ choices of majors in
contemporary settings (see Altonji et al., 2012 for a review of this literature).
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3.3.2 Earnings Differences Across Broad Education Categories
I begin by estimating equation (1) using dummy variables for broad educational categories:
modern, traditional, military, apprenticeship, and police. The police category—that is, educa-
tion in a police academy—is the omitted group; employees in the police category received
less training than those educated in the modern system, the traditional system, a military
academy, or those who apprenticed at a railroad.
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The results from estimating several specifications are presented in Table 3. In column
(1), equation (1) is estimated without any controls—this simply produces results corre-
sponding to what was seen in Table 2: it is interesting that in the raw correlations (without
controls) traditional education is actually associated with significantly higher salaries than
modern education.31
Of course, traditionally-educated individuals differ in many ways compared to the oth-
ers. Thus, in columns (2) and (3) control variables are added to try to account for these
differences. In column (2), quadratic controls for employee age and a set of dummy vari-
ables for province of origin are included, and their inclusion sharply reduces the estimated
coefficient on traditional. The coefficient on traditional is now smaller than the coefficient on
modern, though the two are statistically indistinguishable, and both are significantly greater
than zero (indicating a skill premium for both modern and traditional education of around
40 percent, relative to the police academies).
In column (3), along with the controls included in column (2), a 3rd-order polynomial
in tenure with the JinPu Railroad, the number of jobs worked prior to the current one,
and prior experience with a railroad (using a dummy variable) are all added to the model
(though one should keep in mind the caveat that prior work experience may be an endoge-
nous outcome of individuals’ educational backgrounds).32 Adding these additional con-
trols does not meaningfully change the results: the coefficients on traditional and modern
are significantly different from zero, around 0.4 in magnitude, and statistically indistin-
guishable from each other. The results in Table 3, columns (1) through (3) are somewhat
surprising: not only is traditional education associated with a large salary premium (rel-
31All calculations of significance are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard error estimates. For the
sake of brevity, the discussion of results will focus on the comparison between modern and traditional educa-
tion. The results in Table 3 indicate that military education and apprenticeships were also valuable sources of
human capital, but their analysis is left for future work.
32All reported results are robust to other specification choices as well, for example higher-order polynomial
terms in age or tenure. Results available upon request.
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ative to the relatively less skilled policemen), but it is also approximately as large as that
received by individuals trained in the modern system.
I next subject these results to a pair of robustness tests. First, one might be concerned
that selection into systems of education changed across cohorts as the traditional educa-
tion system was reformed and eventually replaced. In particular, as discussed below (see
Section 4) it is very likely that among the oldest cohorts in our sample, the very best stu-
dents selected into the traditional system—it was far more prestigious, and remunerative,
than the modern system prior to the 1900s (see Elman, 2006 and Chang, 1955). But among
younger cohorts (among individuals who reached their teens after the civil service exams
were abolished), selection might have flipped, favoring the modern system.
To examine whether shifts in selection affect the analysis, I estimate the specification
from Table 3, column (2), but only for individuals at least 40 years old in the sample.33 The
results are shown in Table 3, column (4). Though the coefficients on the dummy variables
traditional and modern are both larger than they were in column (2), the results are quite
similar to those estimated using the unrestricted sample, suggesting that selection of bet-
ter types into the traditional system among the older cohorts, and perhaps worse types
among the younger cohorts does not greatly affect the results above. Interestingly, one
can see a widening of the gap between employees educated in the traditional and modern
systems (compare column 2 to column 4) despite the better selection into traditional educa-
tion among the older cohorts. One possible explanation for this is that although there was
“worse” selection into the modern system among older employees, they are paid relatively
more due to the scarcity of their particular human capital among their own cohorts.
The second robustness check is to control for employee characteristics less paramet-
33The specification in Table 3, column (2) has the virtue of not including controls that may be endogenous
outcomes of an individual’s education. None of the results presented are sensitive to including the possibly
endogenous controls that were included in Table 3, column (3). In addition, none of the results are sensitive
to the inclusion of a full set of occupational department fixed effects (results available from the author upon
request).
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rically than was done above. To this end, I limit the sample to individuals trained in
traditional or modern educational institutions, and estimate the average treatment effect
of having a modern education using a nearest-neighbor matching estimator. I match ob-
servations on their province of origin and age. In Table 3, column (5), one can see that
the matching estimate, too, shows a very small, statistically insignificant difference in log
salaries between those educated in the traditional and in the modern system.
The results found using broad educational categories suggest that the difference be-
tween traditional and modern human capital is not as simple as Chinese reformers might
have led one to believe: traditional education was associated with a salary very similar to
that received by individuals trained in the modern system. But, the categories used above
were crude: within the modern educational hierarchy, there may be a big difference be-
tween studying at a primary school and studying at the university level. At a given level
of schooling, the human capital acquired studying different subjects may be very different.
Thus, I disaggregate the broad schooling categories: first, I examine differences in salaries
associated with narrower categories based on the level of schooling completed; then, I ex-
amine narrow categories based on the content studied.
3.3.3 Earnings Differences Across Narrow Education Categories: Levels of Education
The educational attainment of JinPu employees educated in the modern educational hier-
archy can be divided into three levels: primary/middle school (192 individuals); secondary
school (34 individuals); and, college/university (144 individuals). These are mutually ex-
clusive sub-categories within the broad modern education category; they are not exhaustive,
as they do not include individuals who attended missionary or vocational schools, the level
of which typically cannot be identified in the employee records. Thus, in this analysis, I will
focus on the subset of individuals who attended modern schools that were not missionary
25
or vocational schools (i.e., individuals who studied within the “modern hierarchy”).
The individuals who studied in the traditional system are less easy to classify according
to the level of their schooling. The employee records of only three individuals include notes
indicating the passage of high level imperial exams, but more records indicate the amount
of traditional education completed. I use this information to split the broad traditional
education category into two parts: I create a “low-level traditional” category that includes
employees whose records note that their level of education was “low” or that only “some”
education in a traditional school was completed (13 individuals). The other individuals
are classified as “high-level traditional” (34 individuals). This split is a mutually exclusive,
exhaustive classification of the employees trained in the traditional system.34
Using this disaggregation of the modern educational hierarchy and the traditional edu-
cation system (c ∈ {primary/middle, secondary, university/college, traditional low, traditional high}),
I next estimate equation (1) on the sub-sample of employees educated within the modern
hierarchy or the traditional system. In Table 4, column 1, one can see estimated coeffi-
cients (relative to modern primary/middle school education, the omitted category) on the
disaggregated education level dummies, from a model including quadratic controls for
employee age and province of origin fixed effects. One can see that salaries for employees
with college or university education in the modern system are around 40 percent larger
than salaries of employees educated at high levels in the traditional system or those of
employees educated at the secondary level within the modern hierarchy. A high level of
traditional education is associated with a significant salary premium (around 20%) relative
to individuals educated in modern primary and middle schools, approximately the same
as the premium associated with modern secondary education.
34Note that misclassification of individuals across levels of education will bias results toward finding no
difference across categories. Note also that the absence of information on an individual’s years of schooling
makes it impossible to calculate the return to a year of schooling under the two different educational systems.
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In Table 4, column 2, I add to the specification in column 1 controls for tenure with
the JinPu Railroad and prior experience, and the results are qualitatively similar: modern
tertiary education is associated with a significantly higher salary compared to high-level
traditional education and to lower levels of the modern hierarchy. High-level traditional
education is associated with a significantly higher salary than modern primary/middle
school education, and a modestly (statistically insignificantly) higher salary than modern
secondary schooling.
In column 3, the model from Table 4, column 1, is estimated on the sub-sample of indi-
viduals aged 40 or greater who were educated in the modern hierarchy or in the traditional
system. Again, results are qualitatively unchanged, although (analogous to what was seen
in Table 3) the estimated salary premium paid to individuals with modern tertiary edu-
cation is much larger than when examining the whole sample. As discussed above, this
suggests that scarcity of modern human capital among the oldest cohorts plays an impor-
tant role in determining their salaries.
Finally, in Table 4, column 4, I present the estimated treatment effect of modern univer-
sity/college education relative to high-level traditional education using a nearest-neighbor
matching estimator (examining only employees trained at the tertiary level in the modern
system and employees trained at a high level in the traditional system). One can see that
the highest level of modern education is again associated with a significantly greater salary
than high levels of traditional education.
The results in Table 4 suggest that critiques of traditional schooling must be qualified—
education at high levels in the traditional system was associated with significantly greater
salaries than those earned by employees with low levels of education within the modern
hierarchy, and similar salaries to those earned by individuals educated at the secondary
level in the modern system. But, they also provide strong support for the arguments of
28
the republican-era educational reformers: training at the tertiary level in the modern ed-
ucational hierarchy was associated with an enormous salary premium, even relative to
high levels of traditional schooling, suggesting that the human capital acquired in modern
tertiary schools was especially valuable to a modern, industrial firm.
3.3.4 Earnings Differences Across Narrow Education Categories: Educational Content
I next explore whether particular modern educational content can be more tightly asso-
ciated with the large salary premium associated with high levels of modern schooling.
Specifically, I disaggregate modern tertiary education into three (exhaustive, mutually ex-
clusive) categories: university training in engineering (35 individuals), university training
in other subjects (85 individuals), and attendance at a teachers’ college (24 individuals).
In addition to examining salaries associated with studying different content at the ter-
tiary level in the modern education system, it is of interest to compare these salaries to
those earned by individuals trained at a high level within the traditional system. This al-
lows one to examine salary differences associated with differing content within the highest
level of the modern system, and also between the high-level modern system and the high-
level traditional system.
Using this content-based disaggregation of employees with high levels of schooling (ed-
ucational categories c ∈ {modern university engineering, modern university non-engineering,
modern teachers’ college, high traditional}), I next estimate equation (1) on the sub-sample of
employees educated at the tertiary level in the modern education system or at a high level
in the traditional system. In Table 5, column 1, one can see estimated coefficients (rela-
tive to modern teachers’ college, the omitted category) on the disaggregated educational
content category dummies, from a model including quadratic controls for employee age
and province of origin fixed effects. One can see, first, that engineering training at the
29
university level is associated with extremely high salaries. Salaries for university-trained
engineers are around 50 percent larger than those of employees with university training in
non-engineering fields, and over 100 percent larger than salaries of employees trained at a
high level in the traditional system. While university study outside of engineering earns
smaller premiums than engineering study, salaries are significantly higher for employees
with university degrees in fields such as business, law and economics than for employees
who studied at a high level of the traditional system or who studied at modern teachers’
colleges. Finally, it is of interest that high levels of traditional education are associated with
significantly higher salaries than study at modern teachers’ colleges. This suggests that
the higher salaries earned by employees trained at the tertiary level of the modern system,
compared to those trained at high levels of the traditional system, are not simply a result
of more schooling. Rather, the content studied seems to be an important determinant of the
salary differentials observed.
In Table 5, column 2, I add to the specification in column 1 controls for tenure with the
JinPu Railroad and prior experience, and the results are very similar to those in column 1:
engineering training is associated with very high salaries; university training in fields other
than engineering also earns a large premium, though smaller than engineering training;
and, high-level traditional education is associated with a significantly smaller salary than
modern university training, but a significantly larger salary than education in a teachers’
college.
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In column 3, the model from Table 5, column 1, is estimated on the sub-sample of indi-
viduals aged 40 or greater who were educated at the tertiary level in the modern education
system or at a high level in the traditional system. Results for the modern education cat-
egories are qualitatively similar to columns 1 and 2. However, the coefficient on the high
traditional dummy is now negative (though it is not significantly different from zero). This
result could be due to the small sample in this regression (there are only five employees
with teachers’ college educations aged 40 or older in the sample), or it could be a result of
the scarce modern human capital among the older cohorts.
Next, in Table 5, column 4, I present the estimated treatment effect of university en-
gineering education relative to high-level traditional education using a nearest-neighbor
matching estimator (limiting the sample to employees educated in these two categories).
One can see that university education in engineering is again associated with an economi-
cally and statistically significantly larger salary than high-level traditional education.
In Table 5, column 5, I estimate an analogous specification, but comparing non-engineering
university training to high-level traditional education. One can see that studying subjects
like business, economics, and law at a modern university earned a significant salary pre-
mium relative to high-level traditional education.
Finally, in Table 5, column 6, I present the treatment effect of engineering study relative
to studying other fields at university. One can see that among individuals who studied in
modern universities, those trained in engineering earned significant salary premiums.
The results in Table 5 indicate significant variation in salaries paid to the JinPu Rail-
road’s employees associated with differing educational content. University training in
engineering earned an especially large premium. High level education in the traditional
system earned salaries above those of individuals educated in teachers’ colleges, but sig-
nificantly less than individuals educated in universities, again suggesting that educational
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content played an important role in determining labor market outcomes.35
3.4 Occupation Differences
Differences in salaries provide evidence of employees’ value to the JinPu Railroad, and
so the value of different types of human capital; differences in occupations can provide
complementary evidence of the tasks employees were relatively good at, and help clarify
the mechanisms leading the Railroad to pay individuals with high-level modern (espe-
cially engineering) educations such high salaries. For example, finding that educational
backgrounds were not associated with occupational differences might indicate that individ-
uals with differing educational backgrounds simply had different outside options, which
determined their pay at the JinPu Railroad. Finding that educational backgrounds were as-
sociated with differing occupations would be more consistent with salary differences being
due to different skills produced by different educational content.
To study differences in occupational outcomes across individuals with different educa-
tional backgrounds, I construct a set of occupational categories based on railroad depart-
ments: police, machine, road, clerical, train, hospital, and management. The police department,
unsurprisingly, policed the railroad lines, trains, stations, and property. The machine de-
partment managed and repaired the rolling stock of the railroad. The road department
planned and managed the lines. The clerical department managed paperwork, accounts,
and correspondence. The train department staffed stations and manned switches. The
hospital is self-explanatory. And, the management department managed the affairs of the
entire Railroad.
When analyzing employee occupations, I generally focus on the department in which
35It is reassuring that the results in Table 5 are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls, but one
should keep in mind that selection on unobservables is of particular concern in this analysis: one must be con-
cerned about selection into modern schooling; into higher levels of education; and, into the study of particular
content.
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an employee worked, simply assigning employees in a particular department to their own
occupational category. The single exception to this assignment rule is that individuals with
the specific occupational titles of “secretary” or “clerk”, regardless of their department
within the Railroad, are assigned to the “clerical” category, along with all employees in
the clerical department. In general, I rely on Railroad departments, rather than specific
occupational titles because the titles are often uninformative: for example, “Assistant” is an
extremely common occupation within many departments.36 In Table 6, I present summary
statistics on the occupational categories.
Table 6: Summary Statistics for Occupational Categories
Occupational Category Obs. Mean Number No. Trad. No. Modern Ave. Salary
police 829 0.27 227 3 48 640.1
machine 829 0.33 270 15 177 998.5
roads 829 0.11 95 2 79 1110.3
clerical 829 0.19 158 22 112 1127.3
train 829 0.04 32 3 22 681.1
hospital 829 0.01 5 1 4 1812.0
managerial 829 0.05 42 0 38 1377.2
Note: Salary denominated in Chinese dollars. Average salary is provided for the individuals
with a 1 for the relevant dummy variable and non-missing salary data.
3.4.1 Occupation Differences Across Broad Education Categories
To associate differences in educational backgrounds with differences in occupational out-
comes, I estimate the following model:
OccupationΓi = ∑
c
ψcEducci + φZi + ηi (2)
The outcome variable is simply a dummy variable equal to 1 if employee i is in occu-
36Using the departments as given (without re-assigning secretaries and clerks in non-clerical departments
to the “clerical” category) does not change the results.
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pational category Γ (Γ ∈ {police, machine, road, clerical, train, management}).37 As in the
analysis of salary differences, the explanatory variables of interest are a set of educational
background dummy variables (with education category indexed by c). The model will also
include a set of individual-specific controls (Z), namely, a quadratic function of age, and a
set of province of origin dummies (so φ is a vector).38
I begin by estimating equation (1) using dummy variables for broad educational cate-
gories: modern, traditional, military, apprenticeship, and police. The police category is the omit-
ted group. In Table 7, I present the results of estimating equation (2) for each occupational
category.
One can see in Table 7, column 1, that as one would expect, individuals trained in
both the traditional and modern education systems are significantly less likely than those
trained in a police academy to be employed in the JinPu Railroad’s police department.
There is no difference in the likelihood of employment in the police department between
the traditionally-educated and those educated in the modern system.
In Table 7, column 2, one can see that employees educated in the modern and tradi-
tional systems are both more likely to work in the machine department than are individu-
als trained in police academies. There is no significant difference between the traditionally-
educated and those educated in the modern system in the likelihood of employment in the
machine department.
In Table 7, column 3, one can see the first evidence of differing occupations between in-
dividuals trained in the modern and traditional education systems: individuals trained in
the modern system are significantly more likely than individuals trained in the traditional
37In the analysis that follows I drop the hospital department from the analysis, due to its very small size.
38The analysis in this section is very similar if one includes in the model potentially endogenous controls for
work experience and tenure at the JinPu Railroad. Results also are unaffected if one examines only employees
aged 40 or older. Finally, estimating equation (2) using probit modes rather than OLS also produces very
similar results. Thus, these robustness specifications are omitted for brevity. Results are available from the
author upon request.
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Table 7: Occupational Outcomes Across Broad Education Categories
Occupation Category
Police Machine Road Clerical Train Management
modern -0.753*** 0.373*** 0.218*** 0.069 0.027*** 0.059***
[0.046] [0.032] [0.032] [0.046] [0.010] [0.014]
traditional -0.719*** 0.359*** 0.006 0.299*** 0.049 -0.013
[0.061] [0.071] [0.045] [0.083] [0.037] [0.012]
military -0.089 0.069* 0.109*** -0.122** 0.022 0.013
[0.066] [0.038] [0.042] [0.056] [0.025] [0.023]
apprentice -0.709*** 0.893*** -0.043 -0.113** -0.027** -0.004
[0.078] [0.076] [0.039] [0.050] [0.012] [0.014]
police omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted
p-value: modern=traditional 0.439 0.847 ≤ 0.001 0.002 0.564 ≤ 0.001
obs. 671 671 671 671 671 671
r-squared 0.49 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.06
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Each column represents an independent OLS regression
with a dummy variable indicating that an employee has an occupation in the relevant category
as the outcome variable. The explanatory variables are dummies for broad educational categories
(with police education as the omitted comparison group), and controls for age (a quadratic
polynomial) and a set of province of origin dummy variables. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
system to be employed in the road department that planned and managed the lines of the
JinPu Railroad.
One can next see that there were differences in the clerical department as well: in Ta-
ble 7, column 4, one can see that traditionally-educated employees were significantly more
likely than employees educated in the modern system to be employed in the clerical de-
partment. This disproportionate concentration of traditionally educated employees in the
clerical department is consistent with their intense training in reading and writing, which
were the necessary skills to be productive clerks.
In Table 7, column 5, one can see that there is no significant difference between the
traditionally-educated and those educated in the modern system in the likelihood of em-
ployment in the train department.
Finally, in the highest-paid department (other than the very small hospital department),
the managerial department, one can see that employees with modern education are sig-
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nificantly more likely than are employees with traditional education. This suggests that
despite the aims of the traditionally-educated to be high-level officials in the public sector,
their skills did not naturally translate to managing a modern, industrial firm.
Overall, the findings in Table 7 of significant occupational differences between individ-
uals trained in the modern and traditional systems are consistent with these educational
institutions producing different types of human capital. It is next worth examining whether
those educational backgrounds associated with the highest pay—modern university train-
ing, in particular in engineering—were associated with particular occupational outcomes.
3.4.2 Occupation Differences Across Levels of Education
I next examine how occupations varied across individuals educated at different levels of
the modern and traditional systems. Using the disaggregation of the modern educational
hierarchy and the traditional education system examined above (c ∈ {primary/middle, sec-
ondary, university/college, traditional high, traditional low}), I estimate equation (2) on the sub-
sample of employees educated within the modern hierarchy or the traditional system.
In Table 8, column 1, one can see that there are no systematic differences in the preva-
lence of employees with high-level modern education and high-level traditional education
in the police department. Modern university/college level education is slightly more com-
mon than high-level traditional education, and modern secondary education is slightly less
common. In Table 8, column 2, one can see that there are not systematic differences in the
machine department either.
In the road department, where there were systematic differences between broad mod-
ern and traditional education categories, one can see that this gap is driven both by there
being significantly fewer traditionally-educated employees (low- and high-level), and by
there being an especially large number of employees with tertiary education in the mod-
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Table 8: Occupation Differences Across Levels of Traditional and Modern Schooling
Occupation Category
Police Machine Road Clerical Train Management
modern university/college 0.010 -0.106* 0.074* 0.023 -0.038* 0.022
[0.043] [0.060] [0.043] [0.052] [0.021] [0.030]
modern secondary -0.102*** -0.129 -0.004 0.183** 0.019 -0.036
[0.034] [0.090] [0.062] [0.092] [0.045] [0.052]
high traditional -0.052 -0.014 -0.116** 0.186** 0.042 -0.068***
[0.037] [0.091] [0.053] [0.090] [0.054] [0.021]
low traditional 0.182 -0.155 -0.221*** 0.306** -0.043 -0.057**
[0.124] [0.121] [0.057] [0.146] [0.027] [0.027]
modern primary/middle omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted
p-value: univ.=high trad. 0.12 0.308 0.001 0.077 0.122 0.004
obs. 408 408 408 408 408 408
r-squared 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.05
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Each column represents an independent OLS regression
with a dummy variable indicating that an employee has an occupation in the relevant category
as the outcome variable. The explanatory variables are dummies for narrow educational categories
(with modern primary/middle school education as the omitted comparison group), and controls for
age (a quadratic polynomial) and a set of province of origin dummy variables. Regressions estimated
using individuals educated in the modern hierarchy or the traditional education system.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
ern system (see Table 8, column 3). In the clerical department, one can see that there is a
disproportionately large number of traditionally-educated workers (low- and high-level),
relative to all modern education categories except secondary school (see Table 8, column 4).
In the train department, one can see that none of the educational categories is strongly
associated with the occupation (see Table 8, column 5). Finally, in the management de-
partment, one can see that traditional education (low- and high-level) is broadly under-
represented relative to all of the modern education categories (see Table 8, column 6).
3.4.3 Occupation Differences Associated with Educational Content
I next explore whether particular educational content is associated with particular occupa-
tions. Using the content-based disaggregation of employees with high levels of schooling
used above (educational categories c ∈ {modern university engineering, modern university
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non-engineering, modern teachers’ college, high traditional}), I next estimate equation (2) on
the sub-sample of employees educated at the tertiary level in the modern education sys-
tem or at a high level in the traditional system.
In Table 9, column 1, one can see that engineers are especially unlikely to work in the
police department, and that high-level traditional employees are also very unlikely to work
as police. In Table 9, column 2, one can see that examining the content of education is ex-
tremely important to understanding occupational outcomes: while modern education, and
particularly modern tertiary education, were not strongly associated with work in the ma-
chine department (managing the rolling stock), engineering training is strongly associated
with the machine department.
Table 9: Occupation Differences Associated with the Content of Modern Tertiary Education
Occupation Category
Police Machine Road Clerical Train Management
modern univ. engineers -0.314*** 0.717*** 0.117 -0.401*** -0.040 -0.089
[0.104] [0.103] [0.095] [0.116] [0.031] [0.079]
modern univ. non-engineers -0.185* 0.077 0.140* -0.081 0.000 0.014
[0.102] [0.072] [0.074] [0.116] [0.028] [0.089]
high traditional -0.251*** 0.355*** -0.100 0.034 0.066 -0.133*
[0.097] [0.106] [0.086] [0.135] [0.054] [0.077]
modern teachers’ college omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted
p-value: engineers=high trad. 0.176 0.005 0.037 ≤ 0.001 0.056 0.264
p-value: non-engineers=high trad. 0.182 0.004 0.002 0.234 0.232 0.003
p-value: engineers=non-engineers 0.005 ≤ 0.001 0.778 ≤ 0.001 0.108 0.008
obs. 175 175 175 175 175 175
r-squared 0.19 0.43 0.14 0.21 0.13 0.14
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Each column represents an independent OLS regression with
a dummy variable indicating that an employee has an occupation in the relevant category as the outcome
variable. The explanatory variables are dummies for narrow educational categories (with education
at a teachers’ college as the omitted comparison group), and controls for age (a quadratic polynomial)
and a set of province of origin dummy variables. Regressions estimated using individuals educated at
the tertiary level in the modern hierarchy or at a high level in the traditional education system.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Next, one can see that the positive association between modern (and particularly mod-
ern tertiary) education and work in the road department was driven by employees trained
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at the university level both inside and outside of engineering (see Table 9, column 3). A
link between educational content and occupation can very clearly be seen when examining
the clerical department: one can see a highly significant and negative association between
engineering study and working as a clerk (see Table 9, column 4).
In Table 9, column 5, one can see that none of the educational categories is strongly
linked to work in the train department. Finally, one can see that high-level traditional
education is negatively associated with a managerial occupation; interestingly, university
training outside engineering (e.g., in law or economics) is significantly more common than
university engineering training among the managers of the JinPu Railroad (see Table 9,
column 6).
4 Discussion
In this subsection, I consider several concerns regarding the analysis of salary differences
associated with different educational backgrounds. First, I evaluate the importance of com-
bining salaried and graded workers. Second, I consider the role of variation in unobserved
employee ability across educational categories. Finally, I discuss differences in the labor
supply of individuals trained in the modern and traditional education systems.
4.1 Salaries and Pay Grades
As noted in Section 3.2, for two-thirds of the employees examined above, the JinPu Rail-
road’s records contain specific information on salary; one-third of employees have a pay
grade indicated in their record. In the analysis above, pay grades are converted into salaries
using the mapping provided in the 1932 Railway Yearbook (Tiedao Nianjian), the earliest
yearbook I could find with salaries matched to pay grades.
One might be concerned, however, about changes in wages across time leading the
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salaries associated with pay grades in 1932 to be inflated relative to what those grades
actually earned in 1929. If the likelihood of being a “graded” worker varied with educa-
tional background this could distort the analysis above. In fact, if one regresses a “graded
worker” indicator variable on the educational categories examined above, one sees no sig-
nificant difference in the likelihood of being a graded worker between employees with
modern and traditional education overall, but one does see a significantly greater like-
lihood of being a graded worker among the university-educated in the modern system,
especially among those trained in engineering.39
Table 10: Pay Grades and Salaries: Robustness of Salary Differences Across Broad Educa-
tion Categories
Outcome variable: log(salary)
(1) (2) (3)
modern 0.349*** 0.313*** 0.439***
[0.037] [0.043] [0.088]
traditional 0.284*** 0.305*** 0.285**
[0.066] [0.085] [0.112]
military 0.271*** 0.242*** 0.341***
[0.055] [0.070] [0.109]
apprentice 0.369*** 0.409*** 0.297
[0.077] [0.079] [0.190]
police omitted omitted omitted
p-value: modern=traditional 0.314 0.928 0.109
obs. 665 429 236
r-squared 0.65 0.30 0.31
controls quadratic age, quadratic age, quadratic age,
province dummies province dummies province dummies
grade indicator
employees included all salary only grade only
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Regressions have log salary as an outcome, a set of dummy
variables for broad education categories, and a set of controls. All columns estimated using OLS. Column 1
includes a dummy variable indicating whether an individual’s employment record specified a salary or a
grade, which is converted into a salary as described in the text. Column 2 is estimated using only
individuals whose employment record specifies a salary. Column 3 is estimated using only individuals
whose employment record specifies a grade, which is then converted to a salary.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
39These results are omitted for brevity and are available from the author upon request.
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Table 11: Pay Grades and Salaries: Robustness of Salary Differences Associated with Edu-
cational Levels
Outcome variable: log(salary)
(1) (2) (3)
modern university/college 0.253*** 0.250*** 0.212**
[0.058] [0.077] [0.102]
modern secondary 0.132 0.215** -0.207
[0.084] [0.099] [0.170]
high traditional 0.094 0.092 0.039
[0.071] [0.086] [0.140]
low traditional -0.130 -0.185 -0.219
[0.142] [0.276] [0.147]
modern primary/middle omitted omitted omitted
p-value: university=high traditional 0.043 0.138 0.169
obs. 405 254 151
r-squared 0.66 0.35 0.37
controls quadratic age, quadratic age, quadratic age,
province dummies province dummies province dummies
grade indicator
employees in traditional all salary only grade only
and modern hierarchy included
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Regressions have log salary as an outcome, a set of dummy variables
for broad education categories, and a set of controls. All columns estimated with OLS using only individuals
educated in the modern education hierarchy or in the traditional system. Column 1 includes a dummy variable
indicating whether an individual’s employment record specified a salary or a grade, which is converted into a
salary as described in the text. Column 2 is estimated using only individuals whose employment record specifies
a salary (among those educated in the modern hierarchy or traditional system). Column 3 is estimated using
only individuals whose employment record specifies a grade (among those educated in the modern hierarchy
or traditional system), which is then converted to a salary. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
To examine whether combining graded and ungraded workers drives the salary differ-
ences across educational categories, I first estimate models that add a “graded employee”
dummy variable as a control variable to the specifications of equation (1) examined above
(in addition to controls for a quadratic in employee age and province fixed effects). If there
were a single inflation adjustment that should be applied to graded workers’ salaries, this
control variable would be sufficient.
One can see in the first columns of Tables 10–12 that the findings above are not affected
by inclusion of the “graded worker” control. There is still little difference in salaries be-
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Table 12: Pay Grades and Salaries: Robustness of Salary Differences Associated with Edu-
cational Content
Outcome variable: log(salary)
(1) (2) (3)
modern university engineering 0.738*** 0.666*** 0.677***
[0.112] [0.249] [0.162]
modern university, not engineering 0.490*** 0.573*** 0.434***
[0.094] [0.168] [0.144]
high traditional 0.214** 0.216 0.260
[0.100] [0.140] [0.179]
modern teachers’ college omitted omitted omitted
p-value: engineers=high trad. ≤ 0.001 0.076 0.006
p-value: non-engineers=high trad. 0.005 0.017 0.207
p-value: engineers=non-engineers 0.005 0.645 0.023
obs. 174 70 104
r-squared 0.66 0.47 0.45
controls quadratic age, quadratic age, quadratic age,
province dummies province dummies province dummies
grade indicator
employees with high-level all salary only grade only
trad. and modern tertiary
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Regressions have log salary as an outcome, a set of dummy variables for
broad education categories, and a set of controls. All columns estimated with OLS using only individuals educated
at the tertiary level in the modern system or at a high level in the traditional system. Column 1 includes a dummy
variable indicating whether an individual’s employment record specified a salary or a grade, which is converted
into a salary as described in the text. Column 2 is estimated using only individuals whose employment record
specifies a salary (among those educated at the tertiary level in the modern system or at a high level in the traditional
system). Column 3 is estimated using only individuals whose employment record specifies a grade (among those
educated at the tertiary level in the modern system or at a high level in the traditional system), which is then
converted to a salary. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
tween broad categories of traditionally-educated employees and employees educated in
the modern system (Table 10, column 1, compared to Table 3, column 2). There is still
a large difference between university/college education in the modern system and high-
level traditional education (Table 11, column 1, compared to Table 4, column 1). And, there
are still large salary premiums paid to university training, especially in engineering, com-
pared to high-level traditional education (Table 12, column 1, compared to Table 5, column
1).
As another check of the role played by combining graded and salaried workers, I can
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conduct the analyses above, but splitting the sample between salaried and graded workers.
In the second columns of Tables 10–12, one can see results for only workers earning salaries
in the JinPu Railroad employee records, and in the third columns of Tables 10–12, one can
see results for only graded workers.
Again one can see that the comparative findings across educational categories above
were not driven by the combination of salaried and graded workers (although some mag-
nitudes are somewhat different). Whether examining only salaried workers or only graded
workers, there is no statistically significant difference in salaries (imputed salaries in the
case of the graded workers) paid to employees from the broad traditional or broad mod-
ern education categories (Table 10, columns 2–3 compared to each other, and compared to
Table 3, column 2).40 Whether examining only salaried workers or only graded workers,
one sees not-quite statistically significantly higher salaries paid to employees who stud-
ied in modern university/college than to employees trained at a high level in the tradi-
tional system (Table 11, columns 2–3 compared to each other, and compared to Table 4,
column 1). Finally, examining either salaried workers or graded workers, one can see sta-
tistically significant salary premiums associated with university engineering training, very
high salaries paid to employees trained in universities in subjects other than engineering,
and smaller premiums paid to individuals trained at a high level of the traditional system
(Table 12, columns 2–3 compared to each other, and compared to Table 5, column 1).
4.2 Variation in Unobserved Ability
A standard concern in regressions linking earnings to educational attainment is that edu-
cational attainment is correlated with unobserved ability, which itself helps to determine
earnings. In comparing traditional and modern education, historical evidence suggests
40There is a difference in salaries on the margin of statistical significance among the graded employees.
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that selection into the traditional system was by the more able, due to its greater prestige.
Elman (2006, p. 158) describes the graduates of the modern system as “considered marginal
because they usually had failed the more prestigious civil examinations.” Even later in the
19th century, after the Qing government began incorporating individuals with training in
modern subjects into the bureaucracy, individuals with modern training were at “lower
levels of political rank, cultural distinction, and social esteem” (Elman, 2006, p. 195). Bai
(2014) shows that there was greater study of modern subjects abroad immediately follow-
ing the abolition of the civil service exams in 1905, and that the individuals who moved into
modern study were more able than those studying modern subjects before, providing fur-
ther evidence that the traditional education system (when operative) attracted higher abil-
ity individuals than the modern system. This sort of positive selection into the traditional
system would drive up the estimated return to traditional education, especially among the
early cohorts; it may explain why the return looks as high as it does, but it does not explain
the huge gap between traditional education and university or engineering training.
Finally, the analysis above of employees at least age 40 (compared to the broader sam-
ple) also suggests that selection on ability into educational tracks is not the primary deter-
minant of earnings differences across educational categories. Historical evidence (as noted
above) is abundant indicating more able types studied in the traditional system prior to
its abolition. However, if anything, traditional education is associated with relatively lower
salaries among the oldest cohorts in the JinPu Railroad. This suggests that relative supply
of skills (traditional education was more abundant among the older cohorts in the sample),
rather than selection is a larger determinant of salaries.41
41Another possibility is that even if individuals trained in the traditional system were positively selected
on average, perhaps only the least able of them selected into working in modern firms such as railroads.
Historically, working in teaching or government was much more closely associated with the traditionally-
educated. However, historians have documented far more frequent entry of traditionally-educated gentry
into the private sector beginning in the late 19th century (see Chang, 1955, 1962), especially after the abolition
of the civil service exams in 1905.
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4.3 Variation in Labor Supply
A final concern is that variation in labor supply across individuals with differing skills may
explain the results above. The most basic question is one of relative supply of individuals
with traditional and modern education. By the late 1920s, the supply of training in modern,
Western subjects had already greatly expanded, coming from Chinese schools, especially
in treaty ports and cities with missionary presence, and from study abroad (Yan, 2007; Bai,
2014; Jia, 2014; Bai and Kung, forthcoming). By the late 1920s there were far fewer indi-
viduals with high-level traditional education, as the civil service exams had already been
abolished for 15 years. Thus, the higher wages among the university-trained, especially the
engineers (relative to those trained at a high level in the traditional system) do not seem
likely to arise from relative supply differences.
One might wonder if labor market “frictions” varied across individuals with differing
educational backgrounds. For example, personnel policies in modern firms might have
systematically treated traditionally-educated individuals differently. Perhaps traditionally-
educated workers are concentrated in the clerical department because similarly-trained
individuals might have certain positive complementary effects (they use the same jar-
gon, etc.). This seems unlikely to be the case, however: the majority of employees in
the clerical department in the JinPu Railroad were actually trained in the modern system;
but, the traditionally-educated were disproportionately working there. Thus, traditionally-
educated workers were not, based on hiring policies at the railroad, concentrated in their
own (low-wage) department. They worked alongside those trained in the modern system,
but not in some of the highest paying departments.
Another possibility is that traditionally-educated workers had poorer outside options,
and so were paid less than those educated in the modern system despite being equally pro-
ductive. However, within the clerical department, individuals trained at a high level in the
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traditional system earned wages that were not significantly different from those trained
in modern universities (the salary gap drops from 40 percent across all departments to
under 18 percent within the clerical department). At the high-end of the salary distribu-
tion, the highest-earning traditionally-educated worker earned 95 percent as much as the
highest-paid employee trained in the modern system, again suggesting that there was not
discrimination in wages across educational backgrounds. This suggests that supply differ-
ences and differences in labor market frictions did not lead to pay differences for the same
tasks. Rather, differences in productivity arising from human capital differences seem the
most likely source of occupational and salary differences across employees.
5 Conclusion
The JinPu Railroad’s employee records provide some of the first evidence of the effects of
both modern and traditional education in a modern firm at an early stage of industrial-
ization. The systematic differences in labor market outcomes between individuals trained
in China’s traditional and modern educational tracks suggest that traditional and modern
schools produced types of human capital that were differentially productive in a modern,
industrial firm. Chinese reformers around the turn of the 20th century were thus correct
in believing that modern, Western education could provide especially useful skills for a
developing economy that was adopting new technologies from abroad. These findings in-
dicate that beyond years of schooling, the content of schooling can play an important role
in the process of economic development.
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